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The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism
Edward T. Swaine*
Long before 'Judge Wapner's Animal Court," commercial television broadcast a
nature series perhaps equally relevant to the law-"The Undersea World of Jacques
Cousteau." The show was popular because of what it revealed about a world still
mysterious to many of us. It also appealed, however, because it managed to maintain
that air of mystery-the sense of a truly distinct world that could not be wholly
disclosed, a sense conveyed even more plainly in the tites of Cousteau's Oscar-
winning documentaries, "Le Monde du Silence" and "Le Monde sans Soleil." This
theme undoubtedly owed a great deal to its narrator: more of an explorer, showman,
and advocate than scientist, Cousteau had both a keen sense of drama and a healthy
instinct for leaving the details to others.
Cousteau's oceans come to mind, improbably enough, in contemplating the
Supreme Court's approach to the world of foreign relations federalism. One of the
field's attractions is that it looks so different from the rest of the law, partly because
there simply isn't much real doctrine to worry about. If we have learned anything
from the groundbreaking scholarship of the last five years, its that the most fiercely
held shibboleths-including the orthodox view that the federal government holds a
monopoly in external relations, and the complete vulnerability of states to the
enforcement of international law in federal courts-have little binding precedent for
or against them. The Supreme Court moved first from a period in which few cases
seem to have arisen, to one in which it distinguished the world of foreign relations by
issuing sweeping paeans to national power, and now to an era in which it says virtually
nothing, leaving the little precedent to languish unexplained.
This reticence may have begun thirty years ago, in the wake of Cousteau's own
silent world, but has been most evident in the last ten years. In 1994, for example, the
Court upheld California's controversial worldwide combined reporting method for
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assessing state corporate franchise taxes on multinationals, dismissing claims that the
state policy interfered with the "one voice" America needed to conduct foreign
relations-perhaps because of the particulars of congressional deliberation, and
perhaps because the Court was rejecting sub silentio any "dormant" constitutional
limits on state authority.' Last summer, the Court's eagerly-awaited opinion in Crosby
v National Foreign Trade Council masterfully imparted as little wisdom as possible: the
Court struck down Massachusetts's Burma procurement law on statutory preemption
grounds, avoiding claims that the law violated dormant foreign relations preemption
and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, and even refusing to explain its approach
to questions of statutory preemption in foreign relations cases.2
In the meantime, judges and lawyers with less discretionary dockets must
persevere in deciding cases and rendering advice. In a recent case, for example, the US
District Court for the Southern District of Florida wrestled with whether it should
enjoin a local ordinance restricting Miami-Dade County from doing business with
anyone also doing business with Cuba or Cuban nationals. The court confessed that
it was difficult to decide given "[a] dearth of established precedent in this evolving area
of the law," and looked forward (in vain, as it turned out) to Crosbys resolution of the
matter In the interim, the court guessed that it should enjoin the ordinance, based
on a rather extreme theory of constitutional preemption and statutory field
preemption. A month later, but again prior to Crosby, the US District Court for the
Eastern District of California enjoined California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief
Act, which required insurance companies doing business in California to disclose
European policies issued between 1920 and 1945, on the grounds that the act
interfered with the national government's exclusive authority over foreign relations,
violated the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, and was preempted to boot.4 The
Ninth Circuit later disagreed on all counts, but did so with little reliance on (and,
indeed, in some tension with) Crosby. As to the claim that the state legislation
interfered with dormant federal authority, the court made an effort to distinguish
increasingly remote Supreme Court precedent, but also said it was hesitant to strike
down state legislation when the governing case law itself had lain dormant for so long.'
Unlike judges and practitioners, we academics are only too happy to explore such
murky waters, but like Cousteau, are also too prone to leave them tantalizingly
obscure. Even if courts were prepared to resolve the important controversies of
foreign relations federalism, our scholarship would be of little genuine assistance.
1. Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Bd, 512 US 298, 303 (1994).
2. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000).
3. Miami Light Project v Miamni-Dade County, 97 F Supp 2d 1174, 1179 (SD Fla 2000).
4. Gerling Global Reins Corp v Quackenbusb, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 8815 (ED Cal June 9,2000).
5. Gerling Global Reins Corp v Low, 240 F3d 739, 753 (9th Cir 2001) (affirming the injunction pending
district court's resolution of an unresolved due process claim).
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Recent work has forced us to acknowledge anew that foreign relations federalism
involves reconciling conflicting commitments to national authority and state
authority. Addressing that problem, however, requires several things we lack first, a
clearer understanding of the surrounding constitutional context, second, a notion of
the basic values at stake; third, a means for identifying when those values have been
compromised; and fourth, a rational means for resolving those conflicts we are able to
identify. Drawing attention to these issues may spur us to think collectively about
them, and may suggest strategies for coping with our undersea world.
I. THE UNCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Most everyone was comfortable supposing that the national government
monopolized foreign relations until the Supreme Court actually began applying that
notion. Zscbernig v Miller6 held unconstitutional, as applied, an Oregon intestacy
statute that imposed conditions discriminating against East Germans. The Court was
famously unclear as to the precise basis for its concern-the effect of the state courts"
polemical decisions abroad, their potential for embarrassing the executive branch, or
the fact that the state was attempting to conduct foreign relations-and why doing
any of those things would be unconstitutional. The decision's persuasive force was
further undermined by its isolation. Not only was the decision one of the few real
applications of the monopoly principle, but the Court also failed to come to grips with
largely indistinguishable precedent7 and shortly thereafter seemed to abandon
Zscbernig in turn.
Though I think that Zscernig's result was correct, its reasoning has been easy
picking for critics of virtually every stripe. Recent revisionist scholarship has offered
the most disciplined criticism, one reflecting a more general approach to problems of
foreign relations federalism. The first step of such criticism is to delegitimate the
decision by stressing its departure from tradition: supportive language in prior cases
was dicta, other cases ignored or dismissed similar claims, and the indicted practices
both predated the decision and continued unabated. Step two suggests that the
doctrine's temporary hold has been overtaken by changes in the surrounding world,
such as the easing of Cold War tensions, mounting skepticism about vesting foreign
affairs authority in federal courts, and the diminishing significance of any meaningful
division between domestic and foreign affairs. The third and final step is to argue that
6. 389 US 429 (1968).
7. Compare Clark v Allen, 331 US 503, 517 (1947) (regarding as 'far-ferched" a facial challenge to a
California statute having only an 'incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries') vrth ZaL:rnt.
389 US at 435-36, 441 (arguing that, in contrast, the Oregon statute created more than a mere
"diplomatic bagatelle7 and had "great potential for disruption or embarrassment,' such that it ught
"well [have] adversely affect[ed] the power of the central government to deal with those problems').
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in this modern world, the political alternatives to judicial supervision obviate any real
need for the courts.8
Similar stories are told in related areas. One involves the relationship between
customary international law and state law: the view that custom is preemptive of
federal law arose when state law and old-school custom rarely met; the scope for
federal common law rulemaking was in any event restricted by Erie, and the nature of
custom changed significantly with its application to new subjects like human rights;
and Congress or the President should be left to determine when custom has domestic
effect.' Another case involves the relationship between the treaty power and
constitutional constraints on the exercise of domestic authority. Prior to the Court's
decision in Missouri v Holland, ° it was at least unclear whether the Tenth Amendment
restricted the national government's treaty power, and many expected that treaties
would be confined to purely international matters; the nationalist view taken in that
decision is, in any case, inappropriate given the newly broad view of treaties' domain;
and while the Court's reinvigorated concern for federalism prompts revisiting
Holland," the overall diminution of Tenth Amendment constraints means that
extending it to the treaty power would not be disabling. 2
This sort of patterned argument, I should emphasize, marks a disciplined
intellectual enterprise, and a refreshing change from the rote recitation of nationalist
dicta. The attempt to deprive the orthodoxy of its link to tradition, and to reclaim
tradition as a basis for revision, is itself in the finest tradition of political argument."
But the rest of the analysis-the claim of shifts in constitutional context and the
constitutional sufficiency of orthodoxy's alternatives-seems vulnerable to the simple
objection that we do not know what many relevant parts of the Constitution mean, or
how they add up. The variables are considerable. We no longer know, for example,
whether there is any real doctrine of dormant foreign relations preemption, or when it
applies; whether the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause has broader preemptive
effect than the dormant Commerce Clause; what federalism-based limits constrain the
exercise of the treaty power, if any; or whether congressional-executive agreements or
sole executive agreements are more sharply constrained.
8. See, for example, Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617
(1997).
9. See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997).
10. 252 US 416 (1920) (upholding a migratory bird protection statute implementing a bilateral treaty
against a constitutional challenge based on limits to Congress's domestic lawmaking authority).
11. See, for example, Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the
Treaty Power, 98 Colum L Rev 1726 (1998); Robert Knowles, Comment, Starbucks and the New
Federalism: The Court's Answer to Globalization, 95 Nw U L Rev 735 (2001).
12. Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 Mich L Rev 390,459 (1997).
13. See generally J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History ch 7
(Atheneum 1973).
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Complaining that attendant legal questions are unresolved or confusing probably
seems simpleminded (or, for an academic, even ungrateful, like a dishwasher
complaining about messy eaters). The sensible thing to do is to address each such
uncertainty carefully and exhaustively. But revisionism sets a higher bar for itself. For
one, arguing that the context surrounding a particular doctrine has decisively changed
seems to require taking a fairly broad canvas of the legal landscape. Assume, for
example, that Missouri v Holland came out as it did because the Court was reluctant to
transplant the then-substantial limits on Congress's domestic authority, and supposed
that the treaty power would not be used on matters of intimate domestic concern.
Assume further that both premises were undermined, such that Tenth Amendment
restrictions no longer looked so forbidding and treaties started penetrating the federal
domaine riserv6. We might reasonably conclude, as some suggest, that the Court
unwittingly created a nationalist monster. But the Court rendering Holland might also
(perhaps even simultaneously) be dismayed by the blossoming of state-conducted
international relations and their tension with national authority, and it is hard to
assess how the Court would perceive the supposed changes in treaty authority
without factoring in potential developments in the preemptive scope of dormant
authority-particularly if the Court originally contemplated Zsbcrnjig-type limits
more stringent than those observed nowadays.
Constitutional balancing only reinforces the problem. Revisionist scholarship, to
its credit, routinely assesses whether the doctrinal changes it commends would
seriously upset the balance of constitutional authority. But like nationalists nominally
concerned about federalism (who tend to find that state interests are adequately
protected through the national political process), foreign relations revisionists
dependably suggest that national interests are sufficiently protected by Congress and
the President, who can always engage in preemptive lawmaking courtesy of the
Supremacy Clause. This seems unduly sanguine about the responsiveness of national
political institutions, which in any event behave quite differently than originally
imagined by the Framers. It also has the ironic effect of reinforcing stare decisis.
Concerns that a precedents premises have been eroded somehow, or that newly
recognized principles require bringing dissonant elements into line, are confounded by
the suggestion that the constitutional balance is self-correcting; if the courts somehow
got it wrong, surely the political branches would have set them straight somehow.
Most importantly, one cannot help but wonder how matters unfold if there is
more than one nationalist domino around. Dormant foreign relations preemption
may be unnecessary given the availability of preemptive legislation and treaties. But
what if the Eleventh Amendment not only prevents a subsequent Congress from
imposing damages on states, but also impairs the ability to equitably enforce an extant
treaty-as the Supreme Court suggested in Breard v Greene*'4 (Or if treaties and
14. 523 Us 371,377 (1998).
Fall 2001
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implementing legislation are restricted by the anti-commandeering principle and
revitalized Commerce Clause limits, or if the presumption against the preemption of
state law is much stronger than the presumption favoring preemption in foreign
affairs?) Similarly, we may want to refrain from automatically according to customary
international law the status of preemptive federal law, given the possibility that it may
be expressly endorsed by the national political branches. But what if the President's
foreign policy decisions-which may contribute to the definition of international
custom, or conceivably waive national rights to protest an emerging norm-are
nevertheless not constitutionally sufficient to authorize its domestic incorporation?
I do not mean to suggest that revisionists are peculiarly responsible for
addressing all this; that would be a cruel reward for raising such good questions in the
first place. The point, instead, is that before we can resolve whether the context has
changed, or whether other elements of the constitutional structure provide a sufficient
alternative, it is necessary that we learn a lot about related doctrines.
A partial answer is to conduct scholarship of a still more synthetic nature. The
American Law Institute's successive Restatements of Foreign Relations, and the first
and second editions of Louis Henkin's Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution, have
substantially defined the orthodoxy by creating a comprehensive field of US foreign
relations law. Though a compelling assortment of individual scholarly works suggest
potential revisions to that orthodoxy, it is impossible to assess what they have
achieved until a more integrated work allows us to see the effects of simultaneous
changes in the constitutional landscape.
The real solution, though, will have to come from the courts, in particular the
Supreme Court. One reason so few questions of foreign relations federalism get
answered is because the Court has chastened itself to avoid constitutional grounds for
decision, including by construing statutes to avoid them. This kind of minimalism is
enjoying quite a broad-based revival,"5 but its discretion-laden character leaves
something to be desired,16 especially in this context. Avoiding constitutional questions
may prevent any progress toward a comprehensive understanding of the constitutional
scheme: even as premature constitutional renderings may fail to appreciate legal or
factual circumstances that might later prove influential, the failure to establish
foundational propositions in first generation cases may impoverish or distort the
analysis in later, more marginal constitutional cases. Time also makes a difference in
the real world. We may plausibly regard state-conducted foreign relations activities,
for example, either as precedent-setting or as a deviance; as time passes, and acts are
not censured, courts are more likely to regard them as formative. Finally, very few
areas are genuinely tabula rasa, and avoidance doctrine blinks reality in supposing that
there is a clearly delineated class of unresolved constitutional questions, and that lower
15. See ChristopherJ. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 Colum L Rev 1454 (2000).
16. See generally Anronin Scalia, Tbe Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989).
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courts may comfortably sidestep constitutional questions that appear to be settled. In
Gerling, for instance, the Ninth Circuit plausibly regarded the Supreme Court's own
reticence as indicating that Zscbernig had withered on the vine. That may or may not
be right, but it surely illustrates the difficulty of avoiding constitutional issues in a
world where voids are less common than are rules of uncertain scope and vigor, and
where a lower court may be forced to denigrate or distinguish ostensibly binding
precedent before it can freely put constitutional issues to one side.
II. UNCERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Most lawyers are trained to avoid value-laden arguments, and the monopoly
orthodoxy was typical in making few overt claims about what mattered, or why. The
trick was to assert that the Constitution dictated that states were to have nothing to
do with foreign affairs and that international law was supreme federal law, and then to
avoid saying much more. There was dissonance everywhere, of course, so one needed
to keep repeating these refrains mantra-like-which may have something to do with
the dicta cluttering the US Reports.
But if neither the original understanding, nor binding case law, warrants this
kind of confidence, we have to ask why we should care about apparent losses in federal
or state authority. Arguments for any transformative understanding of foreign
relations federalism invite the same question: if we seek to ensure that some
equilibrium is maintained by constitutional law, surely we must know what values lie
in the balance, even before we try to figure out their relative weights or how to
reconcile them.
The national value most often invoked is the need to maintain the supremacy of
federal policy, but supremacy is not genuinely at issue. No one disputes that properly
enacted treaties, statutes, and executive acts have preemptive authority; as long as
someone makes clear what the law is, supremacy usually takes care of itself. What is
really at stake is the ability of Congress and the President to pursue the national
program without undue state interference, and this value-and the implicit
compromise with state interests-requires some unpacking. The usual explanation
for the federal privilege is that national power is required to resolve collective action
problems. Foreign policy often looks like a public good, in that while states benefit
from a harmonized negotiating position, the appeal of defection (since it may be more
profitable to deviate while others cooperate) may disable cooperation. Positive and
negative externalities are also commonly asserted. State initiatives to protect human
rights in places like South Africa and Burma are striking in part because they seem
unlikely; we would predict that states generally underprovide such activities because
the benefits largely redound to others. Negative externalities are more obvious. If one
state's activities raise hackles in a foreign country, that country may retaliate in a way
that affects other states.
Fall 2001
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But none of this is terribly instructive. For one thing, identifying true collective
action problems-and determining when Tiebout conditions favoring smaller
solutions are absentl 7-may be quite difficult, and it is even harder to generalize about
their prevalence. For example, Peter Spiro has argued forcefully that globalization
makes states increasingly vulnerable to targeted retaliation, thus reducing the potential
for negative externalities. 8 I happen to doubt that this could undermine any case for
exclusive federal authority: foreign countries still have the option of choosing to target
the US as a whole (which, given the national government's presumed authority to
resolve the matter by preemption, they would be foolish to foreswear), and even the
most exquisitely targeted retaliation has spillover effects. To take a contemporary
example, if a foreign country retaliated against California by refusing to supply fuel to
its power plants, other states just might feel the impact. But we do not know,
generally, when spillovers are likely to occur, or when a spillover should be regarded as
an acceptable byproduct of an integrated national economy.
Externalities do not, in any case, explain why exclusive national authority is
necessary, since the power to act preemptively would ordinarily suffice. And even if
we were to suppose that exclusivity is valuable for some reason, we have to wonder
whether it is a pipe dream. Take, for example, the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement on Government Procurement. States wanted to open up
purchasing by all levels of foreign governments, but optimally without compromising
their own discretion; in the end, the US wound up permitting substantial variation
among state commitments, even excluding more than a dozen states from any
obligation. 9 Though such variation might have been in the national interest, it
equally illustrates the limited potential for capitalizing on any monopoly within a
political process permeable to the states.
The arguments in favor of state interests have their own difficulties, though their
claims are usually modest. The stereotypical assertion of states' rights-arguably, the
kind of claim essential to arguing that foreign relations are federal in any strong
sense-would be that certain state interests are inviolable. But the availability of
plenary national foreign affairs authority substantially rebuts any such claim, since (so
far as we know) it may be exercised without regard to limits on domestic authority.
17. For a general discussion, see Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust
State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75
Tex L Rev 1203, 1217-29 (1997).
18. See, for example, Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U Colo L Rev 1223, 1226 (1999)
(concluding that, in light of new participation by states in global affairs, "there is no justification for
the courts to enforce a default rule protecting federal exclusivity in the face of contrary state-level
preferences").
19. Agreement on Government Procurement, art 5, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 4(b), (Apr 15, 1994) available online at
<http://www.wro.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/gpr-94.pdf> (visited Sept 30, 2001).
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The Constitution scarcely goes out the window, and we may assume, for example,
that the US could not sign a treaty with Switzerland by which the two agreed to
divest themselves of all states and cantons." States may also be immune from foreign-
relations commandeering and certain kinds of remedies for treaty violations. But the
unsettled and marginal nature of these safeguards discourages stronger claims of dual
international sovereignty.
A more typical argument for state's rights invokes the principle of
nondiscrimination. As a defense to dormant Foreign Commerce Clause objections,
for example, states routinely claim that they should be treated as would any other
"market participant," and that such a defense applies equally to Zschernig-type
objections. Others argue that states are merely some of the many actors potentially
disrupting the national government's "one voice" in foreign affairs; even if maintaining
that voice is still feasible, it is unfair to single out the states for silencing. The
Supreme Court has, unsurprisingly, never resolved these questions," perhaps because
their implications may be far reaching. While it is theoretically possible to treat states
as favorably as private actors for some purposes, and more favorably in other contexts,
dissonance sets in at some point: if states really do not differ from businesses or
consumers for purposes of dormant foreign relations preemption, it seems all the
more problematic to argue that they deserve special dispensation with respect to
national legislation or treaties. The implications of the comparison are also
unpredictable. Zschernig, for example, alluded favorably to an article arguing that
private corporations, too, should be excluded from interfering with national
diplomacy.
Revisionists similarly protest that federalism should be taken no less seriously in
the foreign relations context. If, for example, the Tenth Amendment limits
Congress's authority to legislate with respect to interstate commerce, it should equally
20. De Geoffrey v Riggs, 133 US 258, 267 (1890) (It would not be contended that it [he treaty power]
extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the
government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the Lter,
without its consent.").
21. See, for example, Brief for Petitioners at 27-29, 37-38, Crosby v Natinr.al Fore n Trade C=:Jn, 530
US 363 (2000). Compare National Foreign Trade Council v Ntsios, 181 F3d 38, 60 (lt ir 1999)
(rejecting such an exception), affd on other grounds, Crosby v National Foren Trade Ccur.,d. 530 US
363 (2000), with Trojan Tecbs, Inc v Pennsylvania, 742 F Supp 900,903 (MD Pa 1990) (describing the
incidental effect of a"Buy American law as owing to state participation in the mare place and not
to any effort to control or regulate commerce with foreign countries").
22. See Reeves, Inc v Stake, 447 US 429,437 n 9(1980) (noting that"(w]e have no Occasion to explore the
limits imposed on state proprietary actions by the 'foreign commerc' Clause," but cautioning that
"Commerce Clause scrutiny may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce is
allged7).
23. See Arthur S. Miller, The Corporation as a Private Govern:ent in &:e World Ccmmunity, 46 V'a L Re%
1539 (1960), cited in Zsckernig, 389 US at 440-41.
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limit the federal government's ability to accomplish similar ends by treaty.24 This has
the virtue of pitching the relative privileging of federal authority, and the diminished
concern for state authority, as foreign relations "exceptionalism," placing the burden
on those arguing for difference rather than making any argument from first principles.
Yet it seems an unlikely place to start. The reason to value federal states, as opposed
to any other kind of decentralized governance, has everything to do with territory-
their claim to local political legitimacy. 2 But contemporary desire to reside in
Maryland, rather than Virginia, probably has little to do with either's approach to
foreign relations, and the choice of Maryland over California probably has even less.
To the contrary, the need to conduct foreign relations effectively has long been
understood as the central basis for the creation of national political legitimacy, and
there has been surprisingly little change. Among recent controversies, Breard involved
Virginia's failure to conduct foreign relations, and even defenders of Massachusetts's
Burma legislation were torn between evoking the Boston Tea Party and relying
instead on the right not to do business with certain foreigners,' or on the immunity
bestowed by the national legislation implementing the Uruguay Round.
The likely retort would be that globalization makes distinguishing locally based
legitimacy increasingly untenable. State prosecutions may involve foreign defendants;
state purchases may involve foreign purchases; state exports are as likely to cross the
oceans as to cross state lines. Globalization's transformative effect is probably
overstated, but if this line-blurring argument is valid, it strikes a serious blow at the
premises for respecting territorial legitimacy in the first place. If state policies become
proportionately more occupied with external relations, the diversity of their local
determinants dwindles; it is not as though Maryland and Virginia interact with
different Burmas, and it is difficult to imagine too many cases in which the distinctive
qualities of a state relate to a foreign matter. Other state values, such as public
participation and experimentation, may often be achieved by other kinds of
decentralization, and are not in any real sense evidenced by recent episodes. A case
24. See Bradley, 97 Mich L Rev at 394-95 (cited in note 12).
25. See Edward L. Rubin, Tbe Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13 Ga St U L Rev 1009, 1013,
1033-34 (1997); Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosits,
41 UCLA L Rev 903 (1994); see also Richard Briffiault, 'What About the 'Ism' Normative and Formal
Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand L Rev 1303, 1337-38, 1344-49 (1994) (stressing
territorial integrity as a feature distinguishing federalism from localism). For a critical response to
Professors Rubin and Feeley, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn L Rev 317 (1997).
26. Such a right would obviously be problematic in the domestic context, where the claim to state
sovereignty is surely stronger. For example, there can be little doubt that Massachusetts would be
unable to refrain from doing business with companies doing business in Virginia, regardless of its
feelings concerning Breard. For an extended argument to this effect, see Alisa B. Klein and Mark B.
Stern, Back to First Principles: The Constitutional Rationale for Invalidating Local Sanctions Against Foreign
Trade, 33 L & Pol in Intl Bus (forthcoming 2001).
27. See Crosby, 530 US at 386 n 24.
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can be made for state interests, to be sure, but as with national interests, we have little
basis for suspecting their ubiquity in foreign relations matters.
III. UNCERTAIN INJURY
So law does not permit us to avoid value-laden questions in reconsidering foreign
relations federalism, and the values to which we are committed in that sphere are also
unclear. This alone makes it difficult for us to imagine rationally resolving apparent
conflicts between federal and state interests. But there is another mystery requiring
attention: even if we knew what kinds of values we were trying to reconcile, how can
we detect their presence? Imagine, perhaps, that an intrepid underwater explorer like
Cousteau, lacking clear instructions from the mainland, has to decide whether to
preserve a fantastic bed of rare coral or salvage the sunken treasure chest enmeshed in
it. Reconciling those two imperatives when they genuinely conflict is a serious
problem, one I want to touch on in the final section. But what if the explorer has
difficulty saying for certain what the objects are (whether it's really rare coral, or a
treasure chest), and whether either is at risk?
The example is far-fetched, but the problem is real: how do we determine when
federal or state values are being meaningfully compromised? Answering seemingly
requires us to develop a means of detecting injury, and inevitably some kind of
threshold as well, tasks at which the monopoly orthodoxy failed nearly completely.
Courts were supposed to use their ordinary procedures for discerning harm, and did
little to encourage government officials in believing that their views would be taken
into account-perhaps because of the awkwardness that would ensue when those
submissions were not followed. The threshold for concern, according to Zschernig,
was whether the state's law has "more than some incidental or indirect effect in foreign
countries," a standard that seemed tailor-made to strain the foreign policy expertise
of courts. For purposes of the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, courts were to
distinguish between matters "merely ha[ving] foreign resonances" from those
"implicat[ing] foreign affairs,"2 an inquiry posing less of a forensic challenge only
because it was more vague. Courts did not even ask about injury to state values, save
implicitly through the lack of concern over trivial infringements of the national
interest.
Revisionists, on the other hand, generally prefer an integrated approach todetecting and addressing injury, one perceiving positive political authority as a self-
contained system. One might imagine, for example, that national values are infringed
when the national government's state of repose is disturbed, and Congress is forced to
legislate when it otherwise would not, the revisionists stress, though, Congress would
28. See Zscbernig, 389 US at 434.
29. Container Corp ofAineria v Franchise Tax Bd, 463 US 159, 194 (1983).
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then have solved the problem itself through preemption. If Congress instead chooses
not to act, and suffers state activities in silence, that in itself may be meaningful, at least
where Congress has "focused its attention" on the issue (as in Barclays) or legislated
without speaking directly to an evident issue (as in Gerling), since Congress may cede
its foreign relations authority without explicitly permitting the states to act.
This leaves the question of what to do when the indicia of congressional will are
less direct-for example, when state foreign affairs activities do not manifestly conflict
with any preexisting legislative scheme, and Congress has not in any meaningful sense
acquiesced. One way of coping is through presumptions, either one generally
disfavoring preemption or the more particular one favoring foreign affairs preemption.
The fact that either might be invoked in foreign affairs cases is itself troubling. The
Court in Crosby opted for neither, but could not help suggesting that it might behave
differently on some future occasion, and so managed to maximize confusion."
Jack Goldsmith has decried this uncertainty, and concluded that there is no
convincing constitutional or normative warrant for either presumption." By his
lights, because we cannot really distinguish truly unprotected interests (a national
interest Congress inadvertently surrenders, or a state interest Congress inadvertently
trammels) from interests that have simply been put through the political wringer, we
should refrain from creating rules that try to nudge Congress one way or the other.
Instead, courts should just read foreign relations statutes as written, and let that be
the guide to where the national interest lies-and, at least by omission, where the
state's interests lie.
There is much to commend this approach, but it throws in the towel a little too
quickly. To be sure, state interests are sometimes compatible with national interests,
and it does seem inappropriate to portray congressional protection of state interests in
human rights treaties and in trade agreements as intrinsically pathological. Not only
does that suppose that such concessions have been extracted from an unwilling
Congress,32 but overlooks that they result from a democratic process to which states
naturally contribute-and, indeed, do so as the principal means of safeguarding their
Tenth Amendment interests.
30. The Court did not directly speak to the issue of any presumption favoring foreign relations
preemption, though some of the opinion's reasoning-and its rather strong result-may be
regarded as supporting such a conclusion. It specifically postponed "for another day a consideration
in this context of a presumption against preemption," thereby suggesting that the presumption
might apply on a context-by-context basis. Crosby, 530 US at 374 n 8. This suggestion was echoed by
its decision in United States v Locke, 529 US 89, 108 (1999), which dismissed any "beginning
assumption" that state regulation was valid in the context of national and international maritime
commerce.
31. SeeJack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 S Ct Rev 175, 195-201.
32. See Curtis Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 Colo L Rev 1089, 1096-97 (1999).
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Nonetheless, state measures will very often conflicr with the national interest,
and Professor Goldsmith's examples of federal-state synergies do not really suggest
otherwise. Even if states can help put "underscrutinized°" foreign activities on the
federal agenda (perhaps in tension with his supposition that an omniscient and alert
Congress is in no danger of overlooking state legislation or permitting it to persist
simply by virtue of inertia), passing state laws is an unnecessarily coercive means of
providing notice. Likewise, while one may suppose that the federal government lacks
the "capacity" to address local constituencies with equal zeal, its failure to do so more
certainly bespeaks a lack of interest or even active disinclination; even where state
activities (like sanctions) might give the national government leverage, we might fairly
assume that strategies uniquely adopted by states were declined for good and proper
reasons. Identifying unprotected interests and reconciling them is difficult, but we
should not assume that some natural harmony allows us to forego the exercise.
In any case, junking statutory presumptions leaves the business of identifying
national and state interests as murky as ever. First, ascertaining how federal legislation
reconciles national and state interests is not substantially easier than generalizing in
the form of presumptions. Even if "the most accurate measure of the [national]
interest is the democratic political process,"" the resulting statutes are often opaque,
and courts are forced to construe them. Just as state sanctions laws may (or may nor)
provide leverage that is compatible with the national interest, those same laws may (or
may not) promote the objectives of particular federal statutes, and it vill often be
difficult to evaluate such contentions based on the statutory text alone. In Crosby, for
example, the Court found it strangely easy to conclude that additional state sanctions
were more overkill than constructive leverage; in contrast, the Gerling court of appeals
seemed to regard the similarity of federal and stare objectives as a clear signal that they
could be reconciled." Neither conclusion was well supported.
Second, bypassing statutory presumptions simply highlights other constitutional
conundrums. Even shorn of its presumptions, preemption doctrine reflects debatable
constitutional premises, like the assumption-blithely accepted in Crosby-that state
laws interfering with the "objectives" of national legislation (but not its terms) are
preempted. That assumption isjust as surely tainted by a sense of the proper roles for
the federal government and the states.35 Moreover, regarding Congress as a sufficient
arbiter of national and state interests assumes that it is the repository of federal
foreign relations authority, when we know that the President also plays a role. The
33. Goldsmith, 2000 S Ct Rev at 193 (cited in note 31).
34. Compare Crosby, 530 US at 379-80 (rejecting argument that sharing the same goal redeemed a state
statute employing different means), with Gerling Global Reins Corp, 240 F3d at 750 (obzerving that
"the Holocaust Act, HVIRA, and the executive branch initiatives share the same policy objecive.
though they seek to achieve that policy objective by varying techniques').
35. See Caleb Nelson, Preanption, 86 Va L Rev 225 (2000) (arguing that "obstacle' preemption, along
with the presumption against preemption, should be discarded).
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absence of any preemptive presidential policy may, of course, merely signal that the
President has declined to exercise authority, which would put the burden on those
seeking to explain why the courts should exercise it in his stead. But the most salient
presidential actions involve diplomacy that is often confidential, highly unstable, and
rarely expressed in any obviously preemptive fashion. Considering the President's
treaty power provides a solid constitutional basis both for national exclusivity and for
excusing otherwise questionable state conduct." It also warrants presuming foreign
relations preemption: even if Congress's vision of the national interest is susceptible to
concrete expression, and should be encouraged to take statutory form, the President
might be presumed to have a policy with respect to every foreign government.
Third, as much as judicially-engineered statutory presumptions may diverge
from congressional intent, we are equally handicapped in understanding Congress and
the President by what the courts are not doing-that is, clarifying the background
constitutional norms. A member of Congress, trying to decide whether to favor
preempting a state sanctions measure, might have the happy thought that by saying
nothing, Congress can avoid the political cost of preemption and perhaps achieve the
same end through the judiciary-and given the lack of clarity in the law, later claim to
be surprised when the activity is deemed constitutional or unconstitutional (or,
depending on which way the wind is blowing, unsurprised). This may be ideal for
politicians more concerned with credit claiming (and blame avoiding) than with policy
certainty, but it is dysfunctional in its public character. Crosby recognized that
Congress legislates with an occasional eye toward legal doctrine, but Justice Souter
must have been writing ironically in opining that congressional inaction "may reflect
nothing more than the settled character of implied preemption doctrine that courts will
dependably apply.""
It may seem equally ironic to dwell on the federal government's inability to
identify injuries to the national interest, since its attention to state interests is the
more imperfect. The concession to states in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, or
through the reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs") sometimes
attached to treaties, may materially understate political solicitude for state interests
were their constitutional constraints completely apparent. States may also be unduly
deferential in asserting their interests. Just as Congress acts against an uncertain
constitutional background, states may be deterred from acting by the vestiges of the
monopoly orthodoxy, and falsely so if that doctrine would no longer command a
majority of the Court. The oft-observed explosion of state activities touching on
foreign relations may be nothing compared to what would transpire if everyone
36. See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 Duke
LJ 1127 (2000).
37. Crosby, 530 US at 387-88 (emphases added).
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understood that the only limits were imposed by actual federal enactments-a point
that neither Congress, nor the Supreme Court, seem inclined to clarify anytime soon.
IV. UNCERTAIN SOLUTIONS
Even if we are unsatisfied with the present capacity of the national political
process to detect and resolve injuries to federal and state values, we may be starved for
alternatives. Injuries to federal and state values, assuming we can detect them, are
largely incommensurable, and resist balancing. To the extent each represent a genuine
legal or political commitment, any clash between them in a given case appears to
require that one or the other be renounced before a decision can be made-a
compromise in the worst sense of the word.s  Judicial balancing raises special
difficulties. Balancing is attractive insofar as it encourages the fullest articulation and
evidencing of competing interests. But its critics are rightly concerned that the
judiciary lacks the institutional expertise to reconcile even the best-documented
claims. Until the relevant lav is better ironed out, too, courts vill be balancing
interests that are not yet defined or prioritized, which can hardly improve the
exercise's credibility.
The challenge, then, is to administer foreign relations federalism in a way that
improves our understanding of the relevant conflicts before pretending to resolve
them. At the risk of sounding simplistic, I think the appropriate model may be one of
informed consent, and we might usefully sketch how a consent-oriented practice
would address the uncertain variables of foreign relations federalism.
Although Congress seems the best forum for mediating national and state
interests, it is chronically short of reliable information," and prone to overlook the
state and local experimentation that nominally marks the genius of federal systems.
Prevailing case law also does a poor job of stimulating state information. Barclays
suggested the advantage of notoriety: California could plausibly claim that because
Congress purposefully refrained from preempting its method of taxation, dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause objections were no longer as vital. But the Court also said
that such passive approval would not be presumed when state activities were
discriminatory4 in combination with Crosby, which deemed it relevant that Congress
38. For a technical explanation of why that need not always be so, see Isaac Levi, Hard Cbz:m:: D:zuemn
Making Under Unresolved Conflict (Cambridge 1986).
39. See generally Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives- Cwosing Instutions in Law Econmizc, anr PuM':
Policy (Chicago 1994).
40. Barclays Bank PLC, 512 US at 323 (Congress may more passively indicate that certain stare practices
do not "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential*, it need nor convey
its intent vith the unmistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that discriminates against
interstate commerce," among other potential flaws). This is arguably an unwmranted import of an
idea from the domestic setting into the foreign: discrimination among nations is often highly
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had failed to adopt legislation that would have exempted Massachusetts-type
41
activities, states might understandably regard stealth as the preferred course for
activities that distinguish among foreign countries.
This state of affairs is plainly unfortunate, but scarcely inevitable. Congress
should be given the opportunity to override state activities with which it would
disagree; at the same time, if a fully informed Congress elects not to preempt the
relevant activities, it seems inappropriate to presume that they are incompatible with
the national interest. The challenge, obviously, is to encourage the states to bring
potentially infringing activities to Congress's attention. Congress might, for example,
require the states to provide notice of laws or other regulatory activities (as opposed
to, say, individual contracts) affecting foreign relations, or suffer a statutorily imposed
presumption that such activities are preempted by any subsequently enacted
legislation. Though requiring state reports might be objected to as a violation of the
anti-commandeering principle, it only results in a presumption,4" and at worst should
fall within the recognized exception for conditional preemption.43 Such a rule might
also be redeemed as a prophylactic exercise of Congress's constitutional authority to
consent to compacts between states and foreign powers. Although the consent
requirement has been loosely read with respect to interstate compacts, case law treats
compacts with foreign powers much more formally, and supports both a broad view of
the compacts subject to constitutional constraint and a narrow reading of state
authority preliminary to such compacts.4 Irrespective of whether this entails the
dormant preemption of state activities, Congress should be entitled to regulate
proactively potentially infringing state activities.
The President's function, particularly in the judicial review of constitutional or
statutory controversies, has been even more gravely impaired. Courts have found it
difficult to steer between undue capitulation to executive branch views, on the one
hand, and betraying the respect owed a coordinate branch, on the other, and so have
failed to come up with any predictable approach. The underlying problem concerns
the uncertain constitutional basis for presidential involvement. If presidential
influence is derived from the Foreign Commerce Clause, for example, it may prove
productive, and does not present the same risk to solidarity as would discriminating against another
state.
41. Crosby, 530 US at 376 n 11, 378 n 13, 385 n 23 (discussing legislative history).
42. Conversely, notice should not by itself resolve the preemption issue in a state's favor, lest federal
legislative authority be reduced to a poor facsimile of the Virginia Plan rejected by the
Constitutional Convention.
43. See New York v United States, 505 US 144, 174 (1992); see also Carlos Manuel Vizqucz, Breard,
Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U Colo L Rev 1317 (1999) (considering whether the anti-
commandeering principle should be applied to the treaty power).
44. See, for example, Holmes v Jennison, 39 US 540, 569-76 (1840) (Taney); Swaine, Negotiating
Federalism, 49 Duke LJ at 1223- 36 (cited in note 36).
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difficult to resolve with congressional authority, particularly when Congress is
perceived to have passively permitted state conduct.
The sounder basis for presidential participation, as I have argued elsewhere, lies
in the Treaty Clause, which gives the President a coequal role in safeguarding and
advancing American interests. Because the President's negotiating function cannot
adequately be protected against encroachment by after-he-fact positive political
enactments, it warrants the dormant preemption of state activities approximating the
negotiation with foreign powers-but would not extend, for example, to state conduct
concerning foreign private parties, or applying equally to foreign and domestic parties
alike. More important for immediate purposes, when the President concurs with
Congress's implied view that otherwise suspect state activities pose no cognizable risk
to the national interest, his submission to that effect should be conclusive as to any
claim that those activities interfere with national prerogatives derived from the treaty
power. This authority may not be entirely welcome, but neither should it be shirked
or delegated to the courts.
The national institutions can also help empower state consent. Congress and the
Senate may find it appropriate to reinvigorate their function as the federal guardians
of state interests, such as by (really) requiring presidential notification of important
negotiations and providing for consultation with relevant congressional committees.4"
Circumstances may also commend the judicious use of RUDs to demarcate
continuing state prerogatives, while resisting suggestions that the invalidation of any
such reservations revives the unqualified terms of the rreaty -a result inconsistent
with any premise of national or state consent. Finally, Congress may also enhance
legislative and state participation by requiring, at least to the extent consistent with
the President's executive and "take care" authority, that the President consult the
states and take their interests into account prior to litigating statutory claims, such as
in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.4
45. See, for example, Svraine, 49 Duke LJ at 1252 n 438 (discussing Circular 175 procedures).
46. See, for example, Domingues v Nevada, 961 P2d 1279, 1281 (Nev 1993) (Rose dissenting) (suggesting
that "if the United States has shown an intent to accept the treaty [International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights] as a whole, the result could be that the United States is bound by all of the
provisions of the treaty, notwithstanding the reservation). For a rebuttal, see Curtis A. Bradley and
Jack L Goldsmith, Treaties, Huroan Rigits, and Conditional Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 436-39
(2000).
47. The Uruguay Act's legislaively-compelled Statement of Administrative Action should nor be
emulated, however, to the extent that it merely seeks to raise logistical barriers to harmonizing
domestic and international legal obligations, nor to the extent that it bars the submission of
probative evidence-in the form of panel or appellate body reports issued by the WVTO-which
may be relevant, if not dispositive, in the judicial evaluation of national injury. Compare Uruguay
Round Agreements Act § 102(c)(1), Pub L No 103-465, 103 Star 4809, 4817 (1994). codifted at 19
USC § 3512(b)(2)(B)(i)(1994) with Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted in 1994
USCCAN 4040.
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The ultimate challenge, I believe, is one that revisionism has not yet begun to
consider: locating new functions and values for the states in a globalized, yet federal,
world. Instead of defending ill-defined prerogatives, insisting that an immeasurable
federal-state balance be maintained, or hoping that state interests are accorded
appropriate respect in the national political process, it may be more constructive to
consider how state consent to the underlying operation of international affairs might
be perfected. Perhaps the possibility of congressionally licensed state compacts with
foreign powers needs to be revived, or the ability to enable genuinely independent
foreign relations by dissident states (while at the same time preventing them from
free-riding on the collective bargaining strength of their peers). Perhaps states need to
be recognized as not just the objects of customary international law, but also as its
subjects, and acknowledged as potential contributors to its norms. Considering what
little we really know about the undersea world of foreign relations federalism may
embolden us to explore still more aggressively in waters that are completely uncharted.
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